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Adjusting the Scottish block grant abatement: the 
algebra of CM and IPC1  
Jim Cuthbert  
 
Abstract 
 
In the Fiscal Settlement negotiations between the UK and Scottish governments earlier this year, one 
important element of the debate crystallised around the choice between the so-called CM and IPC 
methods of adjusting the Block Grant abatement. It is well known that the Treasury's preferred method, the 
CM approach, exposes Scotland to the risk of relative population decline - but the precise mechanism is 
not well known. This note develops a simple algebraic expression for the difference between the two 
methods, and explores some of the implications. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The review of the Fiscal Settlement methodology scheduled for five years of its operation will be a critically 
important juncture. There is a real danger that the review will become side-tracked into an argument about 
the merits of the Treasury's CM method, relative to the IPC approach. 
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify the algebra surrounding the relative properties of the CM and IPC 
approaches to adjusting the Scottish block grant abatement and to use this to highlight some of the issues 
surrounding the choice of method: and, in particular, to argue that there is a real need now to resolve 
some of the ambiguities surrounding the question of what was actually agreed during the fiscal settlement 
negotiations. 
2. Background. 
 
Under the terms of the post-referendum fiscal settlement, the funding of the Scottish government will come 
IURP WZR PDLQ VRXUFHV DERXW KDOI ZLOO FRPH IURP WKH 6FRWWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V EORFN JUDQW GHWHUPLQHG
basically by the Barnett Formula; and about half from taxes, like income tax or a portion of VAT, devolved 
or hypothecated to Scotland. In more detail, the system will operate as follows. There will be an abatement 
WRWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQWDVLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQGHWermined by the original Barnett formula, 
WR DOORZ IRU WKRVH UHYHQXHV ZKLFK ZLOO EH UDLVHG E\ 6FRWODQG¶V GHYROYHG RU K\SRWKHFDWHG WD[HV 7KLV
abatement will initially be set in a neutral fashion, equal to the revenues raised in the base year in Scotland 
by the relevant taxes. Each year subsequently, this abatement will be increased by some form of 
indexation or adjustment. Agreeing on precisely how this adjustment should be carried out turned out to be 
                                                          
1 CM ± Comparable Model; IPC ± Indexed per Capita.  
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one of the main bones of contention between the Westminster and Scottish governments during the Fiscal 
Settlement negotiations. 
The final position reached in these negotiations was an uneasy compromise between two possible 
approaches to adjusting the block grant abatement. The two approaches in question are known as the 
Comparable Model, (CM), and Indexed Per Capita, (IPC), approaches, which are basically defined as 
follows. 
x 7KH&0DSSURDFK LQYROYHVDGMXVWLQJ WKHEORFNJUDQWDEDWHPHQWHDFK\HDUE\DGGLQJRQ6FRWODQG¶V
per capita share of the change in relevant rest of UK, (rUK), tax revenues, multiplied by a 
comparability factor, which represents the initial ratio of Scotland to rUK per capita receipts on the 
relevant tax. 
x The IPC approach involves indexing the block grant abatement each year in line with the growth in 
rUK tax receipts, divided by the relative rate of growth in rUK to Scottish populations. (The approach 
which later came to be denoted as the IPC method was first suggested in Cuthbert, (2015), where the 
unstable nature of indexation methods which did not allow for relative population change was 
discussed.) 
Formal definitions of the two approaches can be found in Annex C to the fiscal agreement between the UK 
and Scottish governments: (UK and Scottish Governments, 2016). 
In the fiscal settlement negotLDWLRQVWKH7UHDVXU\¶VDSSURDFKODWWHUO\ZDVWKDWWKH&0DSSURDFKVKRXOGEH
adopted: while the Scottish government held out strongly for IPC. The agreement that was eventually 
reached was as follows: (for details, see Annex C to the fiscal agreement). For the first five years the CM 
approach would be used ± on the understanding that the results over that period would be adjusted to be 
equivalent to use of IPC. After five years, there would be a review. What is stated about this review in 
Annex C is that:- 
x It would be informed by an independent report on the operation of the system to date. 
x The fiscal framework does not include or assume the method for adjusting the block grant beyond 
the five year transitional period. 
x The method to be used after the review would be jointly agreed by both governments. 
There nevertheless appears to be a good deal of confusion about what the agreement actually means. For 
example, the Secretary of State for Scotland, David Mundell, said the following in his statement to the 
House of Commons on 24th )HEUXDU\ DIWHU WKH DJUHHPHQW ZDV UHDFKHG ³For tax, we will use the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUUHG IXQGLQJ PRGHO 8QGHU WKDW PRGHO WKH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW KROG DOO 6FRWODQG-
specific risks in relation to devolved and assigned taxes, just like they do for devolved spending under the 
Barnett formula. That is fair to Scotland and fair to the rest of the UK. 
However, for a transitional period covering the next Scottish Parliament, the Governments have agreed to 
share those Scotland-specific risks as these powers are implemented. Specifically, the Scottish 
Government will hold the economic risks while the UK Government will hold the population risks, so the 
Scottish Government will not receive a penny less than Barnett funding over the course of the spending 
review simply due to different population growth. By the end of 2021, a review of the framework will be 
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informed by an independent report so we can ensure that we are continuing to deliver Smith in full, with 
the Scottish Government being responsible for the full range of opportunities and risks associated with 
WKHLUQHZUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´ 
This statement by David Mundell can clearly be interpreted as implying that the default position is that the 
&0PRGHOLHWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUUHGIXnding model), should be used after the review. This, for 
H[DPSOH ZDV WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WDNHQ E\ WKH 'DLO\ 7HOHJUDSK ZKHQ UHSRUWLQJ RQ 0XQGHOO¶V VWDWHPHQW
WKH\ VDLG WKDW ³Scottish ministers would be expected to start bearing the financial consequences of 
Scotland having lower population growth after a five-year transitional period for the new powers ends´ 
3. How relative population growth drives the difference between CM and IPC. 
It is indeed well known that the difference between the effects of the CM and IPC approaches to adjusting 
the Block Grant abatement relates to relative population change. It is also well known that the difference 
between the two methods is likely to be significant: e.g., a report by the IFS estimated that the revenues 
available to the Scottish government under CM might be some £330 million per annum less than under 
IPC by 2021, and around £1 billion per annum less by 2031: (Bell et al., 2016, page 31). 
What is perhaps less well known is precisely how relative population change affects the difference 
between the two approaches. The purpose of this section is to provide the algebra to fill this gap. 
Some notation is required first of all: suppose that 
 ܽ௞ = the block grant abatement in year k under CM: 
 ܾ௞ = the block grant abatement in year k under IPC: 
let ߛ௞ =  the relative rate of growth of population in rUK as compared to Scotland in year k: 
( so  ߛ௞ ൌ  ௣ೖషభೄ௣ೖೄ  ௣ೖ௣ೖషభ, where ݌௞ௌ and ݌௞ represent population in year k in Scotland and rUK repectively.) 
Then, given the formulae for the CM and IPC approaches set out in Annex C to the fiscal agreement, 
(paras C24 and C31), it turns out that the relationship between ܽ௞ and ܾ௞ is given by the formula 
  ܽ௞ାଵ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ ൅  ? ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ௞௝ୀ଴ ) ௝ܾ                (1) 
(See Annex for proof.) 
Note the following implications of formula (1). 
a) Since ߛ௞ has historically been greater than 1, (in fact, commonly around 1.0035), the terms ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ ሻ 
will be positive: so the CM abatement will be larger than the IPC abatement. 
b) Further, since the difference between the two approaches is given by the summation term in the above 
formula, the absolute difference will build up cumulatively through time. 
c) Moreover, since ሺ ? െ ିߛ ଵሻ is an increasing function of ߛ, formula (1) contains within itself the potential 
for a re-inforcing feedback mechanism under the CM approach. As the relative size of the CM abatement 
increases through time, this will put increasing pressure on Scottish public expenditure, (or upward 
pressure on Scottish tax rates): leading to depressed relative economic growth: leading to upward 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
4 
 
pressure on relative population growth in rUK, (i.e., an increase in  ): which, feeding back into formula (1), 
will further increase the difference between the CM and IPC abatements: and so on. 
3. Wider implications. 
 
The purpose of this note is not to pre-empt the review of abatement adjustment methods which is 
VFKHGXOHG WR WDNHSODFH LQILYH\HDUV¶ WLPH%XWRQ WKHRWKHUKDQG WKDW UHYLHZZLOOEHDGLIILFXOWHQRXJK
process in its own right: so it is important that the conduct of the review is not clouded by needless 
arguments. As the algebra in the preceding section demonstrates, (and as confirmed by the Bell et.al. 
estimates), if the review comes down to a choice between the CM and IPC methods, then this choice will 
be very significant for Scotland ± particularly given the potential for the CM method to contribute to a self-
reinforcing process of relative economic and population decline. 
As the above quotation from David Mundell indicates, one of the chief protagonists was able to emerge 
from the fiscal settlement negotiations giving the firm impression that the CM approach would be the 
default position after five years: even though the Annex C wording appears to contradict this. The time to 
root out this potential ambiguity is now: after five years, it will be very difficult to go back to determine who 
said what, and what was actually agreed. The best approach would be for a full record of the negotiations 
to be published: this would be consistent with the pledge made by John Swinney in the course of the 
QHJRWLDWLRQV WKDW ³6FRWODQG¶V 3DUOLDPHQW DQG SHRSOH KDYH D ULJKW WR VHH DOO WKH NH\ GRFXPHQWV´ DV
reported, for example, in The Daily Mail, 7th February 2016).  Failing this, a clear agreed statement should 
be issued now by the Scottish government and the Treasury, confirming that Mundell was wrong, and that 
there is indeed no presumption that the CM approach is the default position after five years. To command 
credibility, such a statement would also have to fill in another vital piece of information which is currently 
missing: namely, what is the resolution mechanism if the Westminster and Scottish governments cannot 
reach agreement in the course of the five year review?   
In the absence of further clarity, there is a danger that argument about the relative status of the CM and 
IPC methods could become a distraction in the review process. The main weakness with the current 
settlement is the extent to which, (even with IPC), it exposes Scotland to the danger of becoming locked 
into a progressive cycle of relative economic decline, and increasingly penal indexation of the block grant 
abatement, if Scotland fails to match rUK in the growth of per capita tax receipts. (It is worth recalling that 
WKH ,)6 UHSRUW %HOO HW DO  QRWHG WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V QHZ ILVFDO DUUDQJHPHQWV ORRN ³increasingly 
unusual´LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUPVZLWK³virtually no insurance for future economic shocks or trends that affect 
6FRWODQG¶VGHYROYHGUHYHQXHVDQGwelfare more than they do equivalent spending in rUK´:KHQWKHILYH
year review comes round, there is a real risk, particularly given the secular decline in the North Sea, that 
Scotland will be locked into a just such a cycle of decline. In these circumstances the five year review 
should focus on radical alternatives to IPC indexation ± and should be attempting to put back in place 
arrangements which are consistent with the proper operation of a monetary union. It would be a tragedy if 
the Treasury were able to use the current ambiguity about what was actually agreed post-Smith to distract 
attention into a debate about CM versus IPC: or to use CM as the default position. 
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Annex: Proof of Formula (1). 
In addition to the notation already introduced in section 3, let 
  ܺ௞ denote rUK tax receipts in period k: and let 
  ߙ denote the comparability factor for the CM method. 
According to the definition given in para C22 of the fiscal agreement, (UK and Scottish Governments, 
2016), the comparability factor represents the initial ratio of Scotland to rUK per capita tax receipts: since ܾ଴ , the initial abatement under the IPC scheme, is by definition equal to Scottish tax receipts in the base 
year, it follows that 
  ߙ ൌ  ௕బ௣బೄ ௣బ௑బ        (2) 
From the definition given in para C24 of the fiscal agreement, it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ =  ܽ௞ ൅ ߙ ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖశభ ሺܺ௞ାଵ െ ܺ௞ሻ      (3) 
And it follows from the definition given in para C31 of the fiscal agreement that 
  ܾ௞ ൌ  ܾ଴ ௑ೖ௑బ ௣ೖೄ௣బೄ ௣బ௣ೖ  , hence 
  ܾ௞ ൌ ߙ ௣ೖೄ௣ೖ ܺ௞ .        (4) 
From (3) and (4), it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ ൌ  ܽ௞ ൅ ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ௞ାଵ ௑ೖ௑ೖశభ .      (5) 
Now, since 
௕ೖశభ௕ೖ  = ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖೄ ௣ೖ௣ೖశభ ௑ೖశభ௑ೖ  , it follows that 
 ܾ௞ାଵ ௑ೖ௑ೖశభ ൌ  ܾ௞ ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖೄ ௣ೖ௣ೖశభ ൌ  ܾ௞ߛ௞ାଵିଵ  . 
Substituting this into (5), it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ௞ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ߛ௞ାଵିଵ ܾ௞ : which implies 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ௞ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ௞ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛ௞ାଵିଵ ሻܾ௞     (6) 
Summing equation (6) for all values from 0 up to k implies that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ଴ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ଴ ൅  ? ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ௞௝ୀ଴ ሻ ௝ܾ : 
Since, by definition, ܽ଴ ൌ  ܾ଴ , this establishes formula (1). 
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